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STOP THE MONEY, STOP THE ATTACKS: 
A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO ACHIEVING AN 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST FINANCING 





Money allows terrorist organizations to continue their day-to-day operations.  
Stopping the flow of financial support to terrorist organizations will diminish the 
intensity and frequency of the attacks and ideally lead to a cessation of such 
attacks.  One country may be able to establish barriers to terrorist financing 
through government sanctions.  These barriers will not stop terrorist financing; but 
rather, it will divert it to another country.  The only way to effectively stop such 
financing is to implement international standards for terrorist financing sanctions.  
But as countries differ economically and politically, a solution must accommodate 
each countries’ unique situation.  This comment analyzes the approaches of the 
United States, Tanzania, and Macau, showing the gaping differences that exist 
within the international community. By applying the “Willingness to Buy” 
Theory, this comment offers a solution which coordinates and maximizes 




 Behind every terrorist attack, there are financiers.1  As money flows into 
these organizations, the threat of terrorism persists. 2   Cutting off the financial 
                                                 
*  Vietlong Nguyen, J.D. candidate 2012, Penn State University Dickinson School of 
Law.   First, I would like to thank Professor John E. Lopatka for his insight, knowledge, and 
guidance.  I would also like to thank Thomas Caldwell for his feedback and tremendous 
patience.  Lastly, to my friends and family, I am eternally grateful for your unending support.  
1  See, e.g., NAT. COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 108-09 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.  Osama Bin Laden funded the training of 
Egyptian terrorists in Sudan, as well as Yemeni terrorists in their 1992 attempt to kill U.S. troops in 
Yemen.  Id. at 169 (“The 9/11 plotters . . . spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan 
and conduct their attack.”); but see also Section III.A. infra p. 19 (The validity of the statement; 
however, may depend upon which definition of “terrorism” is applied.). 
2  See Section I.A. infra p. 4. 
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resources for terrorists will drastically alter the landscape of the battlefield.3  Terrorist 
financing sanctions serve a practical and desirable purpose – diminishing the 
effectiveness of terrorist organizations – but the implementation and enforcement of 
these measures are flawed. 4  Throughout the international community, there is 
asymmetric treatment of this issue.  While the United States is at the forefront,5 there 
are other States who are either unable6 or unwilling7 to follow suit.  Once the world 
effectively partakes in this initiative, terrorist financing sanctions will provide a 
strong deterrent against acts of terrorism and will enhance international security.8   
 
 Terrorist threats to international security stem from a wide array of attacks, 
schemes, and ploys.  These are premeditated acts of violence perpetrated against 
noncombatants in furtherance of a political goal.9  It may be a suicide bomber on a 
crowded street, a coordinated bombing of an embassy, or the kidnapping of select 
high-profile individuals; the possibilities are endless and the impact is highly 
effective.  In order to preserve international security, there must be an international 
effort against terrorism.10   
 
 One possible course of action is to take on the terrorists directly by foiling 
the masterminds before their planned attack comes to fruition.  This plan, however, 
would only be a short-term solution to a long-term problem.  The problem lies in the 
terrorist organization’s “ability to regroup and replenish the loss of its physical 
infrastructure and its leadership.”11  Despite having only immediate impact with no 
                                                 
3   Hillel Frisch, Strategic Change in Terrorist Movements: Lessons from Hamas, 32 STUD. IN 
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1049, 1051-1052 (2009) (If terrorist organizations lose their financial 
network, they will have to turn to other less expensive means to carry out their attacks.).   
4  This comment will show that terrorist financing sanctions make a difference when the 
international community participates as a whole.  The problem is the lack of an effective approach 
towards the creation and implementation of these sanctions in non-participating countries.  See, e.g., 
Financing Terrorism: Looking in the Wrong Places, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005, at 63. 
5  See Section I.B.2. infra p. 8. 
6  See Section I.B.4. infra p. 11. 
7  See Section I.B.3. infra p. 19. 
8  See Conclusion Section IV infra p. 24.   
9   There is no internationally accepted definition for “terrorism.”  The U.S. alone has 
multiple definitions for this phenomenon.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (2001) (“violent acts or acts 
dangerous to human life . . . intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the 
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”); 22 U.S.C. § 2656F(d)(2) (2004) (U.S. Department of State: 
“‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”); Dep’t of Def., Dep’t of Def. Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms 368 (Joint Publication 1-02 2010), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (“The calculated use of unlawful violence or 
threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or 
societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”); but see There is no 
UN definition of terrorism, EYE ON THE UN, http://www.eyeontheun.org/facts.asp?1=1&p=61 (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2012) (The U.N. has not defined the term “terrorism.”). 
10  See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (Terrorist financiers will alter their operations in 
order to exploit or bypass standing sanctions.). 
11  Rohan Gunaratna & Aviv Oreg, Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution, 33 
STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1043, 1044 (2010).   
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residual effects, these direct encounters remain vitally important to provide relief to 
innocent bystanders.12 
 
 The other, more favorable, option is to eliminate the financial source; the 
very source that empowers these terrorist organizations with the monetary means to 
conduct their operations.  This would provide a long-term solution to a recurring 
international issue. 13   These financial measures have been implemented, but not 
uniformly throughout the world.14  Though the expected positive consequences are 
tempting, this outcome can only be achieved through full international cooperation.15  
Anything short of full collaboration will provide terrorists with the opportunity to 
exploit the deficient terrorist financing measures.16  This comment advocates that the 
solution to international terrorism is international cooperation to regulate terrorist 
financing.   
 
 Section I will provide a brief overview of current terrorist financing sanctions 
and the international efforts accompanying those sanctions.17  Section II introduces 
the “willingness to buy” theory.  This section will explain how an individual’s 
behavior may be applied to international states in conjunction with terrorist 
financing sanctions.18  Also, this section describes the four categories into which a 
state may fall based on their ability and willingness to implement terrorist financing 
sanctions.  Section III seeks to resolve the terrorist financing problem with a 
reasonable, yet novel, solution which the international community may adopt.19  This 
solution would respond to and combat the continuing threats of terrorism by 
maximizing the participants in terrorist financing sanctions.   
 
I.  THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Nothing is free.  There is a cost associated with everything, including terrorist 
attacks.  With effective terrorist financing sanctions, the frequency of terrorist attacks 
will be reduced.  Countries, however, are in different predicaments.  Some lack the 
financial resources to follow through on these sanctions; whereas others choose to 
refrain from participating.  By understanding the important circumstances that afflict 




                                                 
12  See Section I.A. infra p. 4.  By reducing the amount of money in the hands of terrorists, 
they will be unable to afford weapons and explosive devices.  Therefore, frequency of attacks against 
innocent bystanders will decrease. 
13  See Section III infra p. 19. 
14  Compare United States Section I.B.2. infra p. 8 with Macau Section I.B.3. infra p. 91 and 
Tanzania Section I.B.4. infra p. 11. 
15  See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (“The multilateral effort is based on the notion 
that terrorists will exploit the weakest links in the global financial system.”). 
16  See id. 
17  See Section I. infra p. 3. 
18  See Section II. infra p. 13. 
19  See Section III. infra p. 19. 
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A.  Why International Terrorist Financing Sanctions Are Necessary 
 
 The first step is to understand the underlying goal that these terrorism 
financing measures hope to achieve.  In addition to troops on the ground, another 
way to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring is to cut off their financial 
resources.20  With the means to sever terrorist organizations from their supply of 
munitions, logistical support, or compensation, terrorist activities will come to a 
halt.21 
 
 Terrorist organizations derive their financial support from illegal activities,22 
networks of financial supporters,23 and charitable organizations.24  With the effective 
implementation of terrorist financing sanctions, these terrorist organizations will lose 
their financial resources.  This strategy, in turn, will force terrorists to utilize less 
devastating substitutes.25  Terrorist attacks will, therefore, become less potent.26  The 
beauty of terrorist financing sanctions, at least in the U.S., is that the government 
does not need to show that there was a specific intent by the financier to support, 
directly or indirectly, terrorist organizations.27  Regardless of whom the financier is 
and to whom the money is sent, if the funds are determined to have reached or will 
                                                 
20  President George W. Bush, President Freezes Terrorists’ Assets (Sep. 24, 2001) (“We will 
starve terrorists of funding, turn them against each other, rout them out of their safe hiding places, 
and bring them to justice.”), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html (hereinafter “President Bush’s 
Speech.”). 
21   Frisch, supra note 3, at 1051–1052 (By imposing greater economic costs on current 
terrorist operations, “perpetrator of organized violence will substitute new techniques of violence to 
replace or complement those that are no longer efficient.”). 
22  Mark Basile, Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the 
Current War on Terrorist Financing, 27 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 169, 172 (2004) (“One such 
business is the diamond business, which Al Qaeda runs in Liberia and Burkina Faso, two countries 
involved in the illicit diamond trade.  Al Qaeda diamond trafficking, which has gone undisturbed since 
1998 when it was established in the $20 million industry in West Africa, represents an illegitimate 
business that Al Qaeda has significantly profited from by working with a number of local 
companies.”); see also Hezbollah around the World, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Mar. 31, 2008), 
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/hezbollah_overview.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_5 
(Diamond smuggling and money laundering are some sources of illegal financial support.). 
23   State Sponsors: Iran and Syria, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Mar. 31, 2008), 
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/hezbollah_overview.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_6 
(“Quds force provides Hezbollah with $100-$200 million in funding every year . . .”; “In 2008 alone, 
Iran provided more than $200 million in funding to Lebanon and trained more than 3,000 Hezbollah 
fighters, according to the State Department.”). 
24  Basile, supra note 22, at 171; and Hezbollah around the World, supra note 22. 
25  See Frisch, supra note 3, at 1052 (The Palestinians had to change their strategy.  “As suicide 
bombings became more difficult, Palestinian ballistic and mortar activity significantly increased.”).   
26  See id. at 1054 (Suicide attacks were the main cause of Israeli fatalities.  By forcing the 
Palestinians to change their tactic away from suicide bombing, they were able to carry out more 
attacks, but with less efficiency.).   
27  See Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (2001) (It is a violation of this order for a 
person to “to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or 
financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed . . . or 
determined to be subject to this order.”  There is no requirement that the government must show that 
the person committed the listed acts with the intention of actually supporting terrorist organizations.). 
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soon reach terrorist organizations, then those assets may be frozen.28  By depriving 
terrorist organizations of financial resources, the incentive to engage in these terrorist 
activities will decrease.29   
 
 The financial status of these organizations is well-rooted in deep pockets 
with abundant resources.  The al-Qaeda terrorist network is “approximated at over 
$300 million in value,” 30  dispersing between $30 and $40 million per year. 31  
Hezbollah, on the other hand, has been estimated to maintain an operational budget 
of approximately $200-$500 million annually.32  In addition to criminal activity, other 
countries provide direct financial support to these organizations.  For example, “the 
Iranian regime operates as the central banker of terrorism, spending hundreds of 
millions of dollars each year to fund terrorism.”33   
 
 The other source of terrorist funds comes from charitable contributions. 
Due to the fact that one of five principle pillars of the Islamic religion relates to 
charitable contributions, terrorist organizations have been able to take advantage of 
this tenet.34  Monitoring these charities and its disbursement is integral to the success 
of terrorist financing sanctions.    
 
Funds would be allocated, and accounted for, by the 
charity for community development and charitable 
activities.  Once the full amount was pulled out for the 
charitable project, a small percentage (around 10%) of 
the cash was skimmed off the top and physically 
passed to [terrorist] operative who deposited this clean 
money into [terrorist] accounts.35   
 
                                                 
28  Id. 
29  Frisch, supra note 3, at 1051–1052.  With less financial resources available, the incentive 
for costly attacks greatly decreases as terrorist organizations are required to seek out alternative 
measures which may be ineffective substitutions. 
30  Basile, supra note 22, at 170. 
31   R.T. NAYLOR, WAGES OF CRIME: BLACK MARKETS, ILLEGAL FINANCE, AND THE 
UNDERWORLD ECONOMY 288 (rev. ed. 2004).   
32   Hezbollah’s International Reach, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Dec. 7, 2004), 
http://www.adl.org/terror/hezbollah_print.asp. 
33  Between Feckless and Reckless: U.S. Policy Options to Prevent a Nuclear Iran: Joint Hearing Before 
Subcomm. on the Middle East and South Asia and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the 
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 27 (2008) (statement of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Sec’y 
for Terrorist Fin. & Fin. Crimes). 
34  See, e.g., MILLIARD BURR & ROBERT O. COLLINS, ALMS FOR JIHAD 11–25 (2006); THOMAS 
J. BIERSTEKER & SUE E. ECKERT, COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 9 (2008) (Zakat is 
“the Islamic concept of tithing and alms obliging Muslims to contribute to charitable causes.”); 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 170 (“Some individual donors surely knew, and other did not, 
the ultimate destination of their donations.  Al Qaeda and its friends took advantage of Islam’s strong 
calls for charitable giving, zakat.”). 
35  Basile, supra note 22, at 173. 
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It is estimated that “it cost al-Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities 
before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations.”36  Due to 
lax regulations, donations may be moved to terrorist organizations unbeknownst to 
the donor.37 
 
 Though it is plain to see that charitable donations pose a significant problem 
to the War on Terror internationally,38 there are problems with addressing this issue.  
The first is that many Muslim charities do provide genuine humanitarian assistance 
and services,39 so most of these charitable contributions do not arouse suspicion 
from the authorities.40  Also, because these charities may provide assistance to the 
community, “shutting them down may create serious problems for local beneficiaries 
and have negative impacts on humanitarian needs.”41  Lastly, illegitimate charities will 
continue to accept donations when the semi-legitimate charities are 
decommissioned.42 
 
 With abundant resources available at their disposal, these terrorist 
organizations are able to operate within a spectrum limited only by their creativity.43  
Shockingly, “[a]s today’s weapons of mass destruction go, the human bomb is 
cheap.”44  It costs about $150 to execute a suicide bombing mission.45  “[A]part from 
a willing young man [or woman], all that is needed is such items as nails, gunpowder, 
a battery, a light switch and a short cable, mercury . . . , acetone, and the cost of 
tailoring a belt wide enough to hold six to eight pockets of explosives.”46  More 
expensive than these parts is the transportation to the targeted town.47  The most 
expensive part of a suicide bombing, however, is the payments to the family of the 
suicide bomber.48   
                                                 
36   9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 170 (citing C.I.A. ANALYTIC REPORT, 
TERRORISM: AMOUNT OF MONEY IT TAKES TO KEEP AL-QA'IDA FUNCTIONING (2002), and C.I.A. 
ANALYTIC REPORT, TERRORISM: AL-QA'IDA OPERATING ON A SHOESTRING (undated post-9/11)) 
(emphasis added).   
37  See Basile, supra note 22, at 173-74. 
38  See id. 
39  See Martin Rudner, Hizbollah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering, 33 STUD. 
IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 700, 703 (2010).   
40  See Money Laundering and Terror Fin. Issues in the Middle East: Testimony of Stuart Levey, Under 
Sec’y Office of Terrorism and Fin. Intelligence, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/js2427.aspx. 
41  Basile, supra note 22, at 173. 
42  Id. 
43  See, e.g., Female Suicide Bomber Identified, AL-BAWABA NEWS, Jan. 28, 2002 (“This was the 
first suicide attack carried out by a Palestinian woman.”); Hala Jaber, The Avengers, SUNDAY TIMES 
(LONDON), Dec. 7, 2003 (The use of women is a way around security complications.).   
44  See Nasra Hassan, An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the “Human Bombs”, THE NEW YORKER, 
Nov. 19, 2001. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
48   See, e.g., id.; Palestinians get Saddam Funds, BBC NEWS, Mar. 13, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2846365.stm (Saddam paid $25,000 to the family of a 
suicide bomber but only $10,000 to those who died in combat; Hizbollah increases pay for suicide 
attacks from $20,000 to $100,000 after Israel returns terrorists bodies in "goodwill gesture");  
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 The overarching theme of the terrorist finance sanctions is to “starve 
terrorists of funding . . . and bring them to justice.”49  “Money is the lifeblood of 
terrorist operations.”50  Without the financial ability to supply the organization, the 
incentive for suicide bombers and terrorists drop.  Thus, not only are the lives of 
U.S. and international troops spared, but also those of innocent civilians.   
 
B.  Current Terrorist Financing Sanctions 
 Each sovereign country can choose to handle its affairs as it sees fit.  But, 
when it comes to terrorist financing, the relevant United Nations resolution 
mandates that its member nations pursue a common goal – implement terrorist 
financing sanctions.  Countries (U.S., Macau, and Tanzania), however, have 
responded to this mandate with differing levels of ambition.   
 
1. U.N. Terrorist Financing Resolutions  
 
 In 1999, the U.N. Security Council created the 1267 Committee which had 
the power to freeze financial assets of individuals and entities associated with Al-
Qaida, Osama Bin Laden, and the Taliban.51  These entities were then placed on a 
consolidated list.52  The scope was then broadened in 2001 to include all individuals 
who finance acts of terrorism.53   
 
 Even with very little proof of terrorist financing activity, the controversial 
listing procedure allowed the 1267 Committee to freeze an individual’s [or entity’s] 
assets. 54   The Security Council then conducted a review of all names on the 
consolidated list and established an Office of an Ombudsperson to assist in the 
considerations of delisting requests.55  In the end, however, the decision on whether 
a listed entity is removed remains with the Security Council.56   
 
                                                                                                                                     
MILITANTISLAMMONITOR.ORG, Feb. 15, 2005, http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/434 
(Hezbollah increased payments to family of suicide bombers from $20,000 to $100,000.).   
49  President Bush’s speech, supra note 20. 
50  Id.    
51  S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).   
52  See S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000).   
53  See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).   
54  See S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004) (There was an attempt to 
alleviate this point of tension by requiring the State “submitting new names . . . to include identifying 
information and background information.”  This effort, however, only required states to adhere to the 
“greatest extent possible.”  In the end, individuals and entities may still be listed with limited 
disclosure as to why they have been listed.).  See, e.g., Kalyani Munshani, The Essence of Terrorist Finance: 
An Empirical Study of the U.N. Sanctions Committee and the U.N. Consolidate List, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 
229 (2010) (discussing listing procedures). 
55  See S.C. Res. 1822, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008); S.C. Res. 1904, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).   
56  See U.N. Sec. Council, Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Guidelines of the 
Committee for the Conduct of Its Work, July 22, 2010, 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf (This Sanctions Committee is the 
Committee of the Security Council which was established by Security Council Resolution 1267.). 
2012  Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs  1:1 
 164 
 The exercise of authority by the Security Council in this instance is not an 
abuse of power.  Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the U.N. authorizes the 
Security Council to implement regulations that are binding on all 192 members.57  
This article grants the Security Council the power to “decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, 
and it may call upon the Members of the U.N. to apply such measures.”58  The 
Members of the U.N. are then bound by that decision and are obligated to carry it 
out.59  Furthermore, if there are conflicting obligations between other international 
agreements and the U.N. Charter, the obligations under the U.N. Charter prevail.60  
Although this topic has been the subject of recent litigation,61 this comment will 
assume that the legal authority hierarchy established in the U.N. Charter remains 
unchanged (i.e., U.N. Resolutions trump international agreements).62   
 
2. U.S. as the Frontrunner: Both Willing and Able to Implement Terrorist 
Financing Sanctions 
 
 Shortly after declaring war with Al Qaeda,63 former President George W. 
Bush signed an Executive Order, pursuant to the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, aimed at eliminating terrorist assets. 64   Similar to S.C. 
Resolution 1267, this Executive Order was designed “to disrupt the financial support 
network for terrorists and terrorist organizations by authorizing the U.S. government 
to designate and block the assets of foreign individuals and entities . . . as well as 
their subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associates.”65   
 
 Departing from the tactics of implementing country-wide sanctions, the U.S. 
adopted a more internationally accepted strategy of targeting specific persons and 
entities.66  In order to uproot these financiers of terrorism, the U.S. Treasury Office 
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has over 100 employees “working full time on 
[the] implementation of financial sanctions.” 67   As compared to other Western 
                                                 
57  See U.N. Charter art. 41. 
58  Id.    
59  See U.N. Charter art. 25.   
60  See U.N. Charter art. 103.   
61  See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. V. Council & 
Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351.   
62  See U.N. Charter art. 103. 
63  President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People (Sep. 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 
64  See generally, Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079; President Bush’s speech, supra note 
20. 
65  See Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079. 
66  See John F. Cooney, Targeted Financial Sanctions, 34 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8, 9 (2009) 
(Country-wide sanctions are less favorable because “innocent civilians in the targeted country would 
suffer from cutting its links to international financial markets.”).   
67   MAURICE R. GREENBERG, WILLIAM F. WECHSLER & LEE S. WOLOSKY, TERRORIST 
FINANCING:  REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 2 (2002).   
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nations, OFAC has a significantly greater staff. 68   In addition to the lack of 
manpower, there is a “lack of political will among U.S. allies,” which either ignore or 
assign the issue a lower priority.69   
 
 The terrorism financing sanctions are close to an all-or-nothing situation.70  
For this policy to be effective on the world stage, all members of the U.N. must 
partake in the 1267 Resolution.71  Similar to a chain, the weakest link will cause the 
strategy against terrorist financing to break down. 72   As money is fungible and 
difficult to track, a gap in one country’s domestic laws will create a loophole which 
financiers of terrorism will exploit.73   
 
 Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has spearheaded the attack against terrorist 
financiers. 74   However, future success demands international cooperation and 
participation.  Without a unified effort, terrorist financiers will be able to accomplish 
their goals, leading to the deaths and injuries of tens of thousands of innocent 
people.  Given the financial resources of the U.S., it certainly possesses the ability to 
implement terrorist financing sanctions.  More importantly, its targeted efforts to 
uproot terrorist financing schemes demonstrate its willingness. 
 
3. Macau: Able but not Willing 
 
 Macau was returned to China on December 20, 1999 under a 1987 Joint 
Declaration between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
Portugal.75  Under this declaration, Macau operates with a high degree of autonomy 
and enjoys independent powers.76  However, the country’s autonomy is limited to 
                                                 
68  See id. at 17.  For example, “the Bank of England had a staff of about seven, the French 
Ministry of Finance has two people working part-time, the German Bundesbank had one, and the 
European Commission in Brussels had only one person and a half-time assistant. 
69  Id. at 2. 
70  See id. at 22 (2002) (Deficiencies in political will abroad – along with resulting inadequacies 
in regulatory and enforcement measures – are likely to remain serious impediments to progress); see, 
e.g., id. at 5 (2002) (The al-Qaeda financial network is resilient and is capable of supporting a nomadic 
terrorist organization as it moves around the world.).   
71  See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (“The multilateral effort is based on the notion 
that terrorists will exploit the weakest links in the global financial system.”). 
72  See id.  
73  See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL-QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 223 (2002) 
(“With the U.S. building its multinational coalition and deploying its troops in Afghanistan, the 
Philippines, Yemen and in Georgia, Al Qaeda is responding by building a multinational alliance of 
terrorist groups.  Advancing the concept of the universality of the battle, it is seeking to widen the 
conflict from the territorial to the global, countering U.S. initiatives by expanding its existing 
alliance.”).   
74  See Per Cramer, Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted U.N. Sanctions: The Erosion of Trust in 
the Security Council, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 85, 88 (Erika de Wet 
& Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2003). 
75  See Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and The 
Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macau, China-Port., Apr. 13, 1987, 
available at http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/88/23/dc/en/.   
76  Id.    
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matters not involving foreign policy and defense.77  In that regard, the province is 
bound to the Security Council Resolutions via China’s membership.   
 
 Currently, Macau’s gaming industry generates a substantial portion of the 
country’s direct taxes for public finances,78 but it is also the sector that poses the 
greatest threat to terrorist financing sanctions.  While a colony of Portugal, one 
single private organization, the Sociedade de Turismo e Diversoes de Macau, held 
the only government license for games and casinos, thus giving them a monopoly 
over all gambling.79  This practice, however, ended in 2002 when additional licenses 
were issued.80  Consequently, a flood of new casinos entered the market.81  These 
casinos are now valued at over $10 billion USD/year.82  The revenue generated by 
the new casinos is a welcome addition given the Macuan’s economy’s tourism base.83  
The growth and economy is not the problem the U.S. has with Macau, but rather 
Macau’s threshold reporting requirement.84   
 
 Recently, Macau has been scrutinized for allowing an unreasonably high 
threshold before reporting transactions.85  The international norm reporting level is 
approximately $3,000, and Macau’s is $62,500.  This high threshold allows large sums 
of money to be potentially transferred between financiers and terrorist organizations 
without question. 86   The fear of such a high threshold arrives from the gradual 
evolution of terrorist financing operations.87  For Macau, the high threshold may 
allow the government to maximize tax revenues, but also makes the province a 
potential site for money laundering and terrorist financing activities.88   
 
 The Macau loop-hole presents an easy target for exploitation by terrorist 
financiers.  One could walk up to the counter, withdraw the maximum of $62,500 
and pass it on without any oversight.  Two transactions of this size would be more 
than enough to supply a suicide bomber with an explosive vest and provide 
                                                 
77  Id. 
78   See The Gaming Industry, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION BUREAU OF THE MSAR, 
http://www.gcs.gov.mo/files/factsheet/Gaming_EN.pdf (In 2009, the gaming industry contributed 
$5.71 billion in direct taxes.  This amounted to 65% of Macao’s total public finances.). 
79  Angela Veng Mei Leong, Macau Casinos and Organised Crime, 74 J. MONEY LAUNDERING 
298, 300 (2004).   
80  Id.    
81   See The Gaming Industry, supra note 78 (The MSAR government signed concession 
agreements with Sociedade de Jogos de Macau, Wynn Resorts, and Galaxy Casino Company.  The 
government then allowed sub-concessions which brought in the Venetian Group, MGM Grand 
Paradise, and Melco PBL Gaming.). 
82  See Mary-Anne Toy, A bet bigger than Vegas, THE AGE (MELBOURNE), Apr. 1, 2006, at 3.   
83  See The Gaming Industry, supra note 78 (gaming industry accounts for 65% of Macao’s total 
public finances). 
84  See John Carney, Macau in US Cross Hairs Over Terror Financing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Aug. 15, 2010. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (“Counter-terror experts say some groups have 
simply switched to using more cash, slipping across borders undetected. Authorities say they 
recognise the changing money flows, but cutting them off is no simple matter, particularly in cash-
based economies with loose border controls.”).   
88  See Carney, supra note 84. 
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compensation to his/her family.89  The problem is not that Macau cannot lower the 
threshold, but rather that it chooses not to.  Macau’s concern is that reducing the cap 
from $62,500 to $3,000 would impede high-rollers from gambling, which, 
consequently, would interfere with the Macauan government’s most significant 
source of revenue.90  However, with an economy deeply rooted in the tourism and 
gambling industries, the Macauan economy is extremely vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks.91  Macau has the financial ability to implement terrorist financing sanctions, 
but is unwilling to do so. 
 
4.  Tanzania: Willing but Not Able  
 
 The situation in Tanzania exhibits a different set of problems to the 
implementation of international terrorist finance sanctions.  Unlike Macau, the 
Tanzanian government does not have the financial resources available nor is it a 
priority to implement terrorist financing measures due to financial constraints. 92  
Terrorist organizations in Tanzania and East Africa “[have] concentrated most of the 
financial activities in informal sectors long before 2001.”93  Therefore, “[by] the time 
the U.S. government began its international drive . . . to develop an international 
counter-terrorism finance regime . . . , [these] terrorist finance networks . . . had 
already achieved some insulation.”94   
 
 The more fundamental problems lie in the country’s lack of ability95 and lack 
of priority96 to tackle terrorist financing.  Despite enacting measures in furtherance of 
the terrorist financing sanctions,97 “law enforcement agencies and political agents . . . 
are widely considered among the most corrupt elements of society, [thus] 
undermining their credibility to combat terrorism.”98  Furthermore, even if it were to 
be stipulated that Tanzania had a stable and trustworthy government, there are more 
pressing concerns that demand the local government’s attention before it is able to 
effectively combat terrorism.99  Several of these concerns pertain to the humanitarian 
and economic crises that plague the State.100   
                                                 
89  See, e.g., Hassan, supra note 44 (putting cost of suicide attack at approximately $150); 
Palestinians get Saddam Funds, supra note 48; Hizbollah increases pay, supra note 48. 
90  JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION 3 
(2nd ed. 2010). 
91  See ROSS C. DEVOL ET AL., THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11 ON U.S. METROPOLITAN 
ECONOMIES 5 (Jan. 2002). 
92   See, e.g., Jessica Piombo, Terrorist Financing and Government Response in East Africa, in 
TERRORIST FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES 185, 186 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas 
eds., 2007) (Other issues need to addressed first, such as border security, smuggling, arms transfers, 
and human trafficking.  From these measures, it would indirectly fight terrorist financing but also 
extend beyond the threat of terrorism.).   
93  Id.    
94  Id. 
95  Id. at 197. 
96  Jodi Vittori, Kristin Bremer, & Pasquale Vittori, Islam in Tanzania and Kenya: Ally or Threat 
in the War on Terror?, 32 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1075 (2009). 
97  See Piombo, supra note 92, at 197 (noting Tanzania has criminalized terrorist financing). 
98  Id. at 199.   
99  Id. 
100  Id.  
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 The international dilemma is getting Tanzania, a country unable to effectively 
seek out terrorist financiers, to allocate sufficient resources to an “unimportant” 
domestic cause. 101   To the Tanzanian government, this feat would be nearly 
impossible for several reasons.  First, a strike at terrorist financing may be a strike at 
the foundation of their political power.102  Ironically, if the Tanzanian government 
officials were to implement and enforce the suggested measures, it may erode a base 
of their financial income.103  With part of the government rooted in corruption and 
terrorism, politicians will be hesitant to pursue measures that lead to their demise.   
 
 Secondly, “there simply are no substitutes in these cash-based economies.”104  
Supposing that the Tanzanian government would then pursue sanctions on the 
informal banking systems, they would meet “sharp resistance . . . , potentially leading 
to political upheaval.”105   
 
 Unlike the situation in Macau, Tanzania does not have the capabilities to 
implement effective enforcement measures to combat terrorist financing. 106  
Interestingly, the situation in Tanzania mirrors the former situation in Iraq, where 
one of the most effective counter-terrorism tactics was support for the development 
of a democratically elected government.107  For Tanzania, a government riddled with 
corruption and gapping flaws, the only realistic method for reform requires third-
party intervention to reset and recalibrate the political infrastructure.108  Tanzania, by 
and through its people, would be more than willing to implement these terrorist 
financing measures.  These measures will bring stability to the government and its 
people.  Without sufficient financial resources, Tanzania will be unable to implement 
effective counter-terrorism financing sanctions, despite its willingness to do so.109   
 
 A comparative examination of the counterterrorism financing regimes in the 
U.S., Macau, and Tanzania illustrates the need for a coordinated international effort.  
Depending on the political and economic climate, a state’s ability to allocate 
resources to terrorist financing regulation varies.  Independent from this ability is a 
state’s willingness to actually pursue these measures.  As the following sections will 
show, there is a possible solution to eliminate the gaps in terrorist financing 
sanctions.   
 
                                                 
101  Id. 
102  Piombo, supra note 92, at 200. 
103   Id. at 201.  By providing money laundering services, individuals involved receive 
payments for their assistance. 
104  Id.    
105  Id. 
106  See, e.g., id. at 186 (Other issues are of greater importance to the Tanzanian government 
than terrorist financing sanctions.).   
107  See Piombo, supra note 92, at 202. 
108  See, e.g., id. 
109  Financial resources may be derived from the domestic state or from a foreign source.  
For example, military aid provided by a third-party is a financial resource.  This military aid provides 
the domestic country with a resource which costs nothing to that country.   
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II.  ANALYSIS:  APPLYING THE “WILLINGNESS TO BUY” THEORY TO 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST FINANCING SANCTIONS 
 
 Politics, filled with complex nuances, revolve around give and take.  A more 
simplistic and practical approach would be to apply economics; specifically, 
behavioral economics.  This allows one to understand the decision making processes 
of a country.  This phenomenon explains how a country should react under certain 
stimuli.  Based upon reactions, countries can be classified into one of four categories.  
The dynamic relationship between these categories will allow the creation of an 
effective solution.   
 
A.  Willingness Versus Ability 
 
 To show the inadequacy of the current Security Council resolutions with 
regard to terrorist financing, one must understand the distinction between a state’s 
willingness and ability to implement these measures.  Understanding how a state 
behaves in light of certain factors will allow the international community to tailor an 
effective solution.   
 
 The “willingness to buy” theory, created by George Katona in 1960, was first 
used to analyze individual consumer behaviors, but it may also be applied to 
countries when they are viewed as individual actors.110  By applying this theory to 
states, in regard to terrorist financing sanctions, the theory explains why a state 
chooses to participate (or not to participate).  
 
 The “willingness to buy” theory elaborates on the classical economic 
model.111  The classical model ties one’s consumption directly to its income and 
ability to buy.112  The “willingness to buy” theory, however, holds that there may be 
“fluctuations in willingness to buy, independent of fluctuations in ability to buy, and 
that they, too, influence demand.”113  For example, an individual receives additional 
income, which enables her to make more purchases; however, she refrains from 
making the purchase because of the ongoing economic depression.114 
 
 When an individual acquires income, there are two ways in which the 
consumer may dispose of his or her income: spend or save.115 Depending on that 
person’s propensity to consume and propensity to save, the income would be 
divided accordingly.116  From the money allocated to spending, consumers typically 
                                                 
110  See Section II.B. infra p. 15. 
111  See GEORGE KATONA, THE POWERFUL CONSUMER 5 (1960). 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 25.   
114  Id. at 17.   
115  Id. at 14.   
116   See Propensity to Consume Definition, Britannica.com, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/478975/propensity-to-consume (last visited Apr. 16, 
2012); see also Propensity to Save Definition, Britannica.com, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/478976/propensity-to-save (last visited Apr. 16, 
2012).   
2012  Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs  1:1 
 170 
purchase their necessities before purchasing luxury goods.117  Subsequent purchases 
for non-necessities are categorized as discretionary purchases.118   
 
 Both the classical economic model and the “willingness to buy” theory have 
the same starting point.  The analysis begins with the determination of the 
consumer’s demand, which is the conditions (income, assets, and debts) that grant a 
consumer the ability to buy. 119   A portion of the consumer’s income would be 
siphoned into savings, while the rest would be allocated towards spending.120  Under 
both theories, the consumer would first purchase their necessary goods;121 however, 
classical economics states that discretionary purchases (purchases other than 
necessities) are determined by the remaining availability of income.122   
 
 Unlike classical economics, the “willingness to buy” theory refines 
discretionary expenditures by adding a subjective component.123  As the consumer 
already has the ability to buy (because discretionary expenditures, by their very 
nature, are made from the excess of spending income after necessary purchases have 
been made), the question then falls on whether the consumer would be willing to 
make this purchase. 124   The answer lies in the subjective expectations of the 
consumer.125  In times of economic prosperity and worldwide euphoria, a consumer 
will spend the additional income that he/she has acquired.126  Conversely, when the 
consumer is pessimistic or has an insecure outlook on life, the consumer is less likely 
to spend despite having additional income.127  
 
 This theory can be seen in consumer behavior between World War II and 
the years after its end.  During the war, consumers were not forced to save, yet the 
American people “accumulated approximately $100 billion worth of savings.” 128  
After the war ended, economists believed that an economic crisis would occur as 
soldiers would be demobilized, orders for military equipment would be cancelled, 
and millions of people would be laid off.129  Despite all of those factors, there was no 
economic crisis.  When war turned to peace, consumers expressed a strong desire to 
spend more and save less in spite of economic reconversion.130  While the post-war 
                                                 
117  KATONA, supra note 111, at 14.   
118  Cristina Poncibo, Some Thoughts on the Methodological Approach to EC Consumer Law Reform, 
21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 353, 362 (2009). 
119  KATONA, supra note 111, at 6.   
120  See Propensity to Consume, supra note 116; see also Propensity to Save, supra note 116 
(When a consumer receives income, it may only be spent or saved.  By adding the amount spent to 
the amount saved, you get the consumer’s income.).   
121  KATONA, supra note 111, at 14.   
122  Suppose a consumer makes $100 and decides to save 10%, which is $10.  Of the 
remaining $90, she spends $50 on necessary goods.  Classical economics would hold that the $40 left 
over would be spent on discretionary expenditures.  See id. at 26.   
123  Id. at 25.   
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  See KATONA, supra note 111, at 25. 
127  See id. 
128  Id. at 32. 
129  Id. at 31.   
130  Id. at 32.   
2012 Comment 1:1 
 171 
economy was in a worse economic position, spending increased due to consumer’s 
belief of prosperous futures.131   
 
 The implications of this theory may be applied to the issue of international 
terrorist financing.  By understanding the spending habits of individual countries, a 
more effective solution may be formed which would increase participation in 
creating and maintaining international security.    
 
B.  Applying the “Willingness to Buy” Theory to International Actors 
 In order for international states to fall within the “willingness to buy” theory, 
several factors must be explained so that there are no large incompatibilities between 
an individual’s consumption and the state’s consumption.  As individuals are utility-
maximizers, in that they spend their income on goods that would increase their 
utility, states operate in a similar fashion. 132  While individuals seek to maximize 
happiness, states seek to maximize security.133  Therefore, countries have an incentive 
to implement and enforce sanctions against terrorist financing.134   
 
 Even if a state adamantly opposes the enforcement of these sanctions, 
arguing that international security has no benefit whatsoever to the host country, 
their decision to join the U.N. will impute a derived benefit from greater 
international security. 135   Despite arguments that international security bears no 
benefit, direct or indirect, to the host country or that the country’s decision to join 
was purely political, this comment maintains that a substantial underlying reason for 
participation in the U.N. revolves around the concept of international security.136   
 
 However, unlike individual goods, international security is a public good, 
subject to the “free rider” effect.137  Public goods are “nonrivalrous,” meaning that 
the consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce the availability of 
the good for consumption by others.138  Public goods are also “non-excludable,” 
meaning that no one can effectively be excluded from using the good. 139   The 
problem with the “good” of international security is that states enjoy the benefits the 
good creates but are reluctant to contribute to the system that created those 
benefits.140  Therefore, under the “willingness to buy” theory, able states are willing 
to buy, but they choose not to in hope that they are able to “free ride” the benefits.141   
                                                 
131  See KATONA, supra note 111, at 32. 
132  See ROBERT B. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (6th ed. 2011).   
133  See id. 
134  Id. at 12-13. 
135  See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (“The Purpose[] of the United Nations [is] . . . to maintain 
international peace and security.”).   
136  See, e.g., id.   
137   See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41 (“They hope to benefit at no cost to 
themselves from the payment of others.”). 
138  Id. at 40. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. at 41. 
141  See id. A common example is national defense.  A consumer may be able to increase the 
defense of the nation, but it comes at the risk of injury/death.  However, if the consumer decides to 
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 Next, in looking at a state’s ability to pay, the conditions that grant a state the 
ability to buy are the same as the conditions that grant an individual consumer the 
ability to buy.  The state derives income from taxing individuals and businesses.142  
But unlike individuals who purchase goods, the government provides services to its 
citizens.  From the tax revenue, the government has the option of saving a portion 
for rainy days or spending it on the people.143  Of the portion allocated towards 
spending, it would be divided between necessary services or discretionary services.144 
 
 Necessary services are services which are absolutely necessary to create or 
maintain a fully functional government.145  The most widespread example is national 
defense which the government funds through compulsory taxation.146  Discretionary 
services would be those that are not fundamental to the role of the government, like 
healthcare, social security, etc.147  Enforcement of terrorist financing sanctions falls 
under the latter.   
 
 Similar to an individual’s willingness to buy, a state’s willingness to buy is 
grounded in the state’s subjective expectations based on past events, current 
situation, and future outlook. 148   Here, it would turn on the state’s geographic 
location, past history with terrorist encounters, current investment in the fight 
against terrorist financing, political climate, and expectation of other state’s 
involvement.   
 
 Consequently, states will first allocate their resources toward the creation and 
maintenance of a stable government.  Only then will these states consider the 
implementation of international terrorist financing sanctions. 149   As previously 
mentioned, the problem with the benefits that these sanctions produce is that it is a 
public good.150  With receipt of benefits without payment of resources, some states 
will de-prioritize their investments for terrorist financing sanctions.   
 
 While a state is by no means an individual consumer, states may behave as 
such in their decision-making process.  When a state bases its expenditures on both 
its ability and willingness to pay, it allows the international regulatory body of the 
U.N. to carefully tailor mandates and sanctions in order to maximize participation.   
 
                                                                                                                                     
not contribute to the nation’s defense, there is no possible way to exclude the consumer from this 
benefit. 
142  MILLER & MAINE, supra note 90 at 3. 
143  See, e.g., Propensity to Consume, supra note 116; Propensity to Save, supra note 116. 
144  KATONA, supra note 111, at 15. 
145  See id. at 15 (Expenditures on necessities for the government arises from their obligation 
to provide the required services to the general population). 
146  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41. 
147   See KATONA, supra note 111, at 16-17 (These discretionary expenditures “are not 
inevitably necessary, not habitual, and not made on the spur of the moment.”). 
148  See id. at 26. 
149  See id. at 14-15 (Terrorist financing sanctions are discretionary expenditures which would 
be invested in so long as the necessary obligations have been met.). 
150  See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41. 
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C.  How Terrorist Financing Sanctions Fall Within the “Willingness to Buy” Theory 
 
 When we turn to the specific enforcement of international terrorist financing 
sanctions, there are four categories under which a country may fall: (1) willing and 
able, (2) able but unwilling, (3) willing but unable, and (4) unwilling and unable.  The 
importance of sorting countries into the correct category is that it allows the U.N. to 
better draft specific measures to induce compliance.  More specifically, the key 
objective is to persuade countries in categories 2 and 3 to implement enforcement 
measures against terrorist financing.   
 
 Category 1: Willing and Able.  Category 1 countries, such as the U.S., do not 
require extra attention from the U.N.  For example, the U.S. has already 
demonstrated that it is both willing and able to implement sanctions against terrorist 
financing sanctions.151  Therefore, no additional attention is required to increase or 
maintain their participation.152   
 
 Category 2: Able, but Unwilling.  Countries category 2 may be subdivided by the 
reason for why these countries are able, yet unwilling.  The first subdivision would be 
countries that refuse on political and religious grounds.  Countries, like Iran and 
Syria, which are state-sponsors of terrorism and likely will never agree to the 
implementation of terrorist financing sanction measures.  Furthermore, these 
countries may even argue that these “terrorists” are freedom-fighters and fall outside 
the scope of the targeted group.153   
 
 The second subdivision consists of countries that have neglected to 
implement terrorist sanctions due to the negative economic impact that may result.  
These countries are fully able to spare financial resources in furtherance of the 
international effort to stop or hinder terrorist financiers.154  As seen with Macau, the 
downside to compliance with international measures is the possible negative impact 
borne by the game and casino industry.  For Macau, abiding by the sanctions regime 
may possibly decrease revenue streams from the gaming industry.  However, these 
sanctions are necessary in order to preserve the state’s economy.155   
 
 As economic growth and success depends on continuing international 
security, most category 2 countries and/or provinces like Macau are willing to 
enforce terrorist financing sanctions.  However, the allure of receiving all the benefits 
without having to put in the work tempts these countries to sit back and let category 
                                                 
151  See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
152  See id. (The U.S. has already enacted and implemented terrorist financing sanctions, so 
there is no need for additional incentives.). 
153  See Section III.A. infra p. 19. 
154  See Macau Section I.B.3. supra p. 9. 
155  Terrorist attacks in the United States devastated the country’s economy.  Not even Las 
Vegas was insulated from the fallout.  See, e.g., Gambling Revenue Fell 6.9% in April, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
2003, at C2 (As a result of the war with Iraq and the state of the economy, travel to Las Vegas 
decreased.); DEVOL, supra note 91, at 5; and Attacks May Cost U.S. 1.8 Million Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
2002, at A16 (“The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks will cost the nation more than 1.8 million jobs by the end 
of the year.”). 
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1 countries do all the work.156  Unbeknownst to those in category 2, the success of 
the War on Terror turns heavily on a unified international effort.157   
 
 Category 3: Unwilling, but Able.  As earlier mentioned the application of the 
“willingness to buy” theory begins with the determination of the state’s ability to 
buy. 158   A problem arises when this cannot be established. 159   However, unlike 
individual consumers whose future actions are not bound by their association to a 
group, members in the U.N. have, in essence, pledged their willingness to promote 
international security through their participation within the U.N. itself.160  So in the 
context of countries within the U.N., it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that a 
state is unable yet willing.161   
 
 When we are presented with a category 3 state, the problem arises from the 
inability of the state to expend their precious resources on discretionary expenditures 
when they are not even able to supply the basic services of a functional government.  
A “free rider” effect takes place as these countries enjoy the fruits of other states’ 
labor. 162   However, unlike category 2 countries, the predicament cannot be 
ameliorated by the same inducements.   
 
 Tanzania, for example, has both an unstable government and terrorist 
organizations residing within its borders.163  The government is filled with corrupt 
politicians and, as a result, these terrorist financing measures are left unenforced.164  
If the U.N. were to force Tanzania, by any means necessary, to implement and 
enforce terrorist financing sanctions, it would create more problems than it would 
solve.165  Terrorist organizations thrive on ineffective government and this forced 
diversion from necessary services to discretionary services would bolster terrorism in 
Tanzania.166  While a unified international effort is required to successfully inhibit the 
financing of terrorism, one-hundred percent cooperation may be an unnecessary evil 
in this case. 
 
                                                 
156  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41. 
157  See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63 (“The multilateral effort is based on the notion 
that terrorists will exploit the weakest links in the global financial system.”). 
158  KATONA, supra note 111, at 25. 
159  Id. at 3-4 (The “willingness to buy” theory requires the consumer to first have the ability 
to buy, then the second part is to analyze whether the consumer would be willing to make the 
purchase.). 
160  U.N. Charter art. 103.   
161  See id.   
162  COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 41. 
163  See Piombo, supra note 92, at 202. 
164  See id. at 200-01 (Effective implementation of terrorist financing sanctions will only affect 
the politician’s political survival.  So even though these measures have been enacted, they have yet to 
be enforced.). 
165  See, e.g., id. at 201 (The Tanzanian government would face mass protests if it tried to 
crack down on terrorist finance routes); id. at 186 (More pressing matters that concerns the Tanzanian 
government include effective border security, control of illicit activities, and human trafficking). 
166  See, e.g., id. at 202 (Combating terrorism in Tanzania requires police and security forces.  
By implementing financing sanctions, nothing would be done to solve the underlying problem.). 
2012 Comment 1:1 
 175 
 Category 4: Neither Willing nor Able.  Category 4 countries are both unable and 
unwilling to implement terrorist financing sanctions.  Again, this category may be 
broken down into two subdivisions.  One group is developing countries that are 
supported by Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism.  The other category is 
developing countries that have not yet joined the U.N.  This group, however, is 
extremely small.167  There is no possible way for the U.N. or its regulatory bodies to 
extend sanctions beyond their jurisdiction.  In lieu of the abundance of benefits a 
state derives from participation with the U.N., these countries will be granted full 
free-riding privilege. 
 
III.  FOUR-STEP SOLUTION 
 
 Much attention has been paid to the quality of the procedures through which 
organizations, entities, and even individuals are targeted.  Some argue that too much 
discretion is left in the hands of government with no supervisory oversight. 168  
Others claim that a more effective answer to the harsh treatment of sanctions is to 
create an intermediate level between no sanctions and sanctions.169  This comment 
does not address the fairness question presented when a target has been listed and 
subjected to sanctions.  Rather, this comment seeks to examine a separate flaw in the 
system - the lack of international implementation and enforcement of terrorist 
financing sanctions.  In addition, this comment proposes a four-step solution 
designed to eliminate terrorist financing networks and bring devastating terrorist 
attacks to a halt.   
 
A.  Defining “Terrorism”  
 
 Before implementing any specific enforcement mechanism, the parameters in 
which the body operates must be defined.  More specifically, “terrorism” needs an 
international definition.170   
 
 One of the biggest threats of terrorism is the lack of consensus on “how to 
define [international] terrorism.” 171   While the international agreement may be 
difficult, the U.S., shockingly, has nineteen different definitions of terrorism in 
                                                 
167  See UN welcomes South Sudan as 193rd Member State, UN NEWS CENTRE (July 14, 2011), 
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39034&Cr=South+Sudan&Cr1= 
(The United Nations currently has 193 Member States.); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Independent 
States of the World (July 29, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (The U.S. 
Department of State currently recognizes 195 independent states in the world.). 
168  Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, Warsaw, 16.V.2005. 
169  See generally Robert E. O’Leary, Improving the Terrorist Finance Sanctions Process, 42 N.Y.U. 
INT’L L. & POL. 549 (2010).   
170  See, e.g., There is no UN Definition for Terrorism, supra note 9. 
171  Craig S. Smith, Debate Over Iraq Raises Fears of a Shrinking Role for NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 2003 (quoting Celeste A. Wallander, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies). 
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federal law.172  With so many conflicting definitions, the prerequisite requirement 
lacks clarity.   
 
 The discrepancy arises through the manner in which terrorism is defined.  
Generally, “[t]errorism is defined variously by the perpetrators’ motives, methods, 
targets, and victims.”173  For example, the U.N. attempted to distinguish between 
“terrorists” and “freedom fighters,” in which acts of violence in pursuit of self-
determination do not constitute terrorism. 174   The approach, however, may 
“legitimate as non-terrorist certain groups nearly universally recognized as terrorist, 
including . . . Hezbollah, and Hamas.”175 
 
 Others have found it more suitable to define terrorism solely by the method 
of violence. 176   For instance, the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism prescribes  certain offenses, such as the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, or 
automatic firearm that endanger persons, as terrorist acts.177  In doing so, it explicitly 
removes the actor’s political judgment by defining most violent acts as not 
political.178  This approach, however, leaves evil minded people with the opportunity 
to avoid terrorist liability by tailoring their methods outside of the statute’s scope.179 
 
 Another approach to the definition of terrorism is to “focus on the victims 
of the attacks or the relationship between the perpetrators and the victims.”180  The 
victims are selected as the target of violence and exist in a state of chronic fear.181 
They are immobilized and become disoriented and/or compliant.182  The impact of 
                                                 
172  See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1) (2001); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(5) 
(2001); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) (2008); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(1) (2008); 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (1996); 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1992 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22) (2006); 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2010); 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2004); 22 U.S.C. § 2708(k)(1) (2008); Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 2(15), 116 Stat. 2135, 2141 (2002); id. at 2242; Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(A), 116 Stat. 2322, 2323-24 (2002); 49 
U.S.C.A. § 44703(g)(3) (2010); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(1), 
110 Stat. 1541, 1549 (1996); Exec. Order No. 13224, § 3, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,080; 28 C.F.R. § 
0.85(1) (2003). 
173  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 107 n. 42 (2d Cir. 2003). But see Arab Convention 
on the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, IOR 51/001/2002 (Terrorism is defined, but it is 
only deemed a terrorist attack if it committed against  the Arab states; otherwise, it is not an act of 
terrorism.). 
174  See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
Among Co-operating States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 21 (Oct. 24, 1971). 
175  Yousef, 327 F.3d at 107 n. 42. 
176  European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, 1137 U.N.T.S. 
93. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 107 n. 42. 
180  Id. 
181  ALEX P. SCHMID & ALBERT J. JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM 1-2 (1988). 
182  Id. at 2. 
2012 Comment 1:1 
 177 
the violence, however, extends beyond the victims to the audience.183  This causes 
the audience to change their behavior to favor the terrorists’ interest.184   
 
 The problem should be obvious: how to fight terrorism when there is no 
universal definition?  Applying the abstraction of Coase Theorem would help answer 
this question.  This theorem states that “[w]hen transactions costs185 are zero, an 
efficient use of resources results from private bargaining, regardless of the legal 
assignment of . . . rights.”186  In the alternative, “[w]hen transaction costs are high 
enough to prevent bargaining, the efficient use of resources will depend on how . . . 
rights are assigned.”187  The U.N. consists of 192 members,188 many of whom offer 
different definitions of “terrorism.”  If it is left to U.N. member states to create a 
definition, the cost of bargaining will be insurmountable. 189   The U.N. needs to 
create a reasonable definition for “terrorism” that is binding on all member states.190  
The definition itself is not as important as the clear-cut standard it creates.  It 
provides notice of which actions are “terrorist” acts and which are not.191 
 
B.  Create a U.N. Committee to Determine the States’ Category 
 Once a workable definition of terrorism is agreed upon, the second step 
requires the U.N. to create a committee (similar to the 1267 Committee) with the 
authority to place members into the three possible categories.192   
 
 With a set definition in place, this committee would categorize each state.  
Countries fully partaking in the sanctioning effort (both willing and able) will fall 
under Category 1.  These states would not be sanctioned; rather, the committee 
would bestow special privileges onto them.193   
                                                 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185   COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 85 (“‘transaction costs’ [encompasses] all 
impediments to bargaining.”  So the vast amount of States with an interest in the definition of 
“terrorism” would constitute as an impediment.). 
186  Id. 
187  Id. 
188  United Nations Member States, supra note 167. 
189  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 88 (“Bargaining becomes more costly and 
difficult as it involves more parties.”). 
190  This comment makes no effort to present a method in which this definition may be 
ascertained.  It asserts the end conclusion that one must be established to aid the fight against 
terrorism.  See, e.g., H.H.A. Cooper, Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition, 26 CHITTY'S L.J. 
105 (1978) (“The problem of the definition of terrorism is more than semantic.  It is really a cloak for 
a complexity of problems, psychological, political, legalistic, and practical.”); Michael P. 
Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of War Crimes: A Case of Too Much Convergence between 
International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 391 (2001) 
(“The problem of defining ‘terrorism’ has vexed the international community for years.”).  
191  The definition should not be set in stone and should be open to amendments and 
modification.  Also, it should include a residual clause to allow new innovative tactics to fall within its 
categorization.   
192  While there are four possible categories of willingness and ability, Category 4 is not an 
option.  It is assumed that when a county joins the United Nations, they agree to be bound by the 
U.N. Charter.  Therefore, all states must be “willing.”  See Section II.C.4. supra p. 19. 
193  See Section III.C. infra p. 22. 
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 Category 2 (unwilling, but able) and Category 3 (unable, but willing) states 
will be determined by analyzing their economic status.  The spectrum will range from 
developed to undeveloped (or poor to rich).  States determined to be developed will 
fall under Category 2; whereas those that are not will fall under Category 3.  The duty 
of this committee is purely administrative with no enforcement mechanism.  It has 
one simple task: determine the applicable category for each state. 
 
C.  Grant Regulatory Authority to Category 1 States over Category 2 and Category 3 States 
 Rather than have the U.N. create an enforcement mechanism, this authority 
will be delegated to states that are both willing and able (Category 1).  This solution 
will allow Category 1 states to regulate terrorist financing sanctions of non-compliant 
states (Category 2 & 3).  By expanding the authority of compliant countries, it 
addresses the enforcement gap within the international scheme.   
 
 For the compliant states, this is a double-edged sword.  The material benefit 
here is that Category 1 states have the opportunity to usurp limited control over the 
affairs of a non-compliant state.  But at the same time, the additional exercise of 
authority imposes a financial burden.  For some, this may be an opportunity for 
Category 1 states to enhance its influence on the international stage.  For others, like 
the U.S., it would be an opportunity to fix a broken system.  With compliant states 
picking up the slack, it is more difficult for terrorist organizations to find and exploit 
the weak links.194 
 
 To noncompliant states, the message is clear:  implement effective terrorist 
financing sanctions or have someone else do it for you.  Category 2 states will 
internalize this threat on their autonomy and respond accordingly. 195   However, 
Category 3 states have no choice but to have a third-party intervene in their affairs.  
To some, it is a blessing.196  To others, like Tanzania, which are rooted in corruption, 
third-party intervention will corrode their political power.197 
 
 The authority bestowed upon Category 1 states will make several impacts.  
Here, Category 2 states will immediately implement effective terrorist financing 
sanctions for fear of losing a portion of their sovereignty.  Because these states are 
able to implement terrorist financing sanctions, the balancing of sovereignty with 
increased financial burden will usually fall in favor of sovereignty.  Once these 
sanctions have been enacted, the committee (created in the previous section) will 
routinely review the states within each category.  Therefore, Category 2 states may be 
                                                 
194  See Financing Terrorism, supra note 4, at 63. 
195  Category 2 states have the ability to provide for effective terrorist financing sanctions; 
however, they choose not to as it run against one of their interests.  The threat to autonomy should 
make Category 2 states very willing to comply.  See Category 2 Section II.C.2. supra p. 17. 
196  Category 3 states do not have the ability to provide for effective terrorist financing 
sanctions.  First, these states must provide the necessary services to its citizens, but until it can do 
that, its discretionary expenditures (i.e. funds for terrorist financing sanctions) are limited.  See 
Category 3 in Section II.C.3. supra p. 18. 
197  See, e.g., Piombo, supra note 92, at 201. 
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re-categorized as Category 1 states when committee deems this state to have 
demonstrated its willingness and ability.   
 
 The other impact comes from the sharpened focus of Category 1 states on 
developing and implementing terrorist financing sanctions in Category 3 states.  This 
will lessen the burden of each Category 1 state.  Category 3 states will then receive 
the benefit of discretionary services without having the ability to provide for it.   
 
 In the end, this solution will guarantee an international effort against terrorist 
financing.  Category 2 will become empty as the threat of decreased autonomy forces 
compliance.  All that would remain are Category 1 & 3 with Category 1 states filling 
in where Category 3 states cannot.   
 
D.  Reduce the Involvement of the U.S. in Pursuing Terrorist Financiers 
 
 One of the biggest impediments to international involvement stems from the 
U.S.’s investment in the terrorist financing sanctions.  With the U.S. taking such a 
dominant role, other countries feel no pressure to implement these sanctions for 
their safety.  However, by initially expanding the possible scope of U.S. jurisdiction, 
it forces many other countries to enact effective sanctions. 198   With others 
participating in fighting terrorist financiers, the U.S.’s role will lessen.    
 
 International security is a free-ride good, meaning that all countries benefit 
from increased international security regardless of whether that country has invested 
in the effort.199  It is also non-excludable.200  The U.S. would be unable to limit the 
benefits of their terrorist financing sanctions to only themselves and other 
participating countries.201  Therefore, countries like Tanzania will reap the benefits 
despite being unable to pay into the system.202  Also, countries/provinces like Macau 
will also be able to enjoy the benefits even if they do not want to participate.203   
 
 Once other states implement effective terrorist financing measures, the U.S. 
will be able to reduce its role.  Also, because an international effort is in place, the 
lessened U.S. role will not bear negative consequences.  If the U.S. were to limit its 
effort prior to the establishment of an international effort, the threat of terrorism 
would potentially increase.  But, by decreasing its effort after, this issue is averted.   
 
 By decreasing the U.S.’s role, the goal is to integrate other states into the 
regulatory scheme.  If a state believes its contribution has gone unnoticed, hidden in 
the shadow of the U.S., it will be hesitant to continue to contribute.  By 
simultaneously removing the U.S. from the pedestal and increasing the participation 
                                                 
198  See Section III.C. supra p. 22. 
199  COOTER & ULEN, supra note 118, at 41.   
200  See id. at 40. 
201  See id. 
202  See Tanzania Section I.B.4. supra p. 11. 
203  See Macau Section I.B.3. supra p. 9. 
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of other actors, the importance of an international commitment to the fight against 
terrorist financing will be solidified.   
 
 The weakness here is that the U.S. has been and continues to be a key target 
of terrorist attacks.204  Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has been leading the charge 
with regards to terrorist financing sanctions.205  Having been attacked by terrorist 
organizations, the U.S. greatly values international security.206  Therefore, an increase 
in international participation will not alter the U.S.’s level of regulation.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Terrorism and the havoc it wreaks are real.  These attacks affect people in 
every corner of the world.  From the rich to the poor, the concussive effect of 
terrorism knows no boundaries.  While the U.S. was the primary target of the 9/11 
attacks, the impact left the entire world in disarray.207   
 
 Terrorist attacks, however, can be prevented and/or mitigated.  There are 
substantial financial resources that go into the execution of each terrorist attack.208  
By eliminating financial support to terrorist organizations, their policies and 
methodologies will drastically change.209  The lives of innocent victims will be spared.  
No longer will civilians have to live in fear of uncertain death. 
 
 Theoretically, terrorist financing sanctions seem trivial and obvious.  The 
issue lies in the implementation and enforcement of these sanctions.  Similar to a 
colander, anything short of a unified international effort to block each loop-hole, 
financial resources will be diverted, but still flow through to terrorist organizations.210  
Every state needs to cooperate in order to effectively sever the ties between terrorist 
financiers and terrorist organizations.211   
 
 The problem arises when countries cannot or choose not to pay into the 
international system.  In the current state of affairs, terrorist financiers can move and 
launder money with ease.212  A solution needs to be introduced which holds all 
countries to the U.N. Charter.213  By usurping a portion of a nation’s sovereignty, this 
                                                 
204   See, e.g., The Terrorist Attack Cycle: Selecting the Target, STRATFOR GLOBAL 
INTELLIGENCE, Sept. 30, 2005 (Terrorists will choose their targets carefully.  “They prefer to generate 
a [high] number of casualties and generate more media attention.”). 
205   See Cramer, supra note 74 at 88.   
206   After the 9/11 attacks, the dangers of terrorist attacks became a reality.  The fact 
Americans were attacked on their own soil instills fear, which will affect one’s valuation of 
goods/services.  See, e.g., KATONA, supra note 111, at 26. 
207  Floyd Norris & Jonathan Fuerbringer, Stocks Tumble Abroad; Exchanges in New York Never 
Opened for the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001. 
208   See, e.g., Hassan, supra note 44; Palestinians get Saddam Funds, supra note 48; Hizbollah 
increases pay, supra note 48. 
209  See Frisch, supra note 3, at 1052. 
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will ensure that all countries that are able to implement terrorist financing sanctions 
do so.214  This will bear two effects: (1) all countries that are able to implement these 
sanctions will exploit the opportunity to expand their sovereignty; and (2) only 
countries that are unable will remain subject to third-party regulations. 
 
 In the end, this will maximize the number of participants in the fight against 
terrorist financiers.  Terrorist organizations will starve and dissolve.  The fight 
against terrorism will take a turn for the best.  While international terrorist financing 
sanctions cannot prevent all acts of terrorisms, these sanctions will reduce the 
frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks.   
                                                 
214  See Section III.C. supra p. 22. 
